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Self-with-Other in Teacher Practice: a Case Study through Care, Aristotelian 
Virtue and Buddhist Ethics. 
 
Abstract 
Many teacher candidates get their first taste of life as a full-time teacher in their 
practicums, during which they confront a host of challenges, pedagogical and ethical.  
Because ethics is fundamental to the connection between teachers and students, teacher-
candidates are often required to negotiate dilemmas in ways that keep with the ethical 
ideals espoused both by the professional body and the community at large.   Presenting 
the case of a teacher-candidate who finds herself emotionally depleted in her devotion to 
students, we look to the ethics of care and virtue, two luminary paradigms, for clarifying 
insights.  Care ethics extols inter-subjectivity and reciprocity, while virtue ethics enjoins 
commitment to a noble ideal for its own sake; both perspectives offer useful insights for 
our case.  We argue that the perspectives and practices of contemplative traditions can 
facilitate the integration of care and virtue ethics, mitigating the risk of disruption in 
caring relations while minimizing the possibility of a personal preoccupation with virtue.  
Drawing on the Bodhisattva ideal in Mahayana Buddhism, we posit a “practice of self-
with-other” as a way to enlarge a teacher’s relational capacity, thus apprehending 
reciprocity and virtue as an interpenetrating mutuality.  We conclude with reflections on 
how contemplative perspectives might inform the teaching of ethics in teacher education 
programs. 
 
Keywords:  Care, Noddings, Virtue, Aristotle, Mahayana, Buddhism, Ethics, Teacher 
Education, Practice, Teacher Candidates, Relationship. 
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Introduction 
The teaching practicum is one of the most demanding components of teacher-education.  
School and faculty supervisors expect teacher candidates (TCs) not only to apply current 
pedagogical theories to their classroom practice, but also to meet the academic and 
emotional needs of their students.  These complex layers of responsibilities portend the 
experience of a career in education; the practicum is an immersive trial in which the 
teacher candidates’ competencies are forged and tested.  This baptism by fire can prove 
overwhelming for some, and is challenging even for those who emerge successfully on 
the other end.  
 The practicum illustrates a constellation of factors that make teaching such a 
challenging profession.  First, current pedagogical theories have advanced instructional 
and assessment approaches that emphasize ongoing teacher feedback and guidance in 
promoting student learning (Chappuis et al., 2011).  Many teachers are now providing 
several opportunities for students to work toward mastery, supplying guidance and 
direction at every stage of practice.  Many teachers and teacher candidates that we have 
encountered report an increase in workload as a result of adopting this new approach to 
instruction.  Secondly, urban demographics, at least here in British Columbia, are 
increasingly diverse – classrooms today see students from many cultural, ethnic and 
linguistic backgrounds.  Further, students with unique social, developmental, emotional 
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and intellectual needs are increasingly part of the mainstream classroom.  While the 
diversity in the composition of classrooms has enriched the learning experiences of many 
students, it also requires greater skill and knowledge from the teacher as she navigates the 
complex terrain of intersecting demands.  Changes in governments’ funding policies here 
in British Columbia , have also eroded resources and supports at the school level, leaving 
many teachers toiling in isolation (Fallon & Poole, 2014).  These compounding factors 
exact an increasing toll on teachers, who must now work harder and longer to help 
students meet desired educational ends. 
While teacher burn-out has always been a troubling phenomenon (Vandenberghe 
& Huberman, 1999), the increasingly adverse conditions that compel otherwise caring 
and conscientious individuals to leave the task of nurturing children raise a series of 
ethical problems.  What do we require of teachers in their efforts to educate students?  
How much do we expect teachers to give? What ethical insights can we provide teachers 
in a system that often depletes a teacher’s psychological, emotional and physical 
resources in the pursuit of worthy educational goals?  With this nexus of questions in 
mind, we present in the next section a case of an exhausted teacher candidate at the end 
of her emotional resources.  We then consult care and virtue ethics for direction, since 
both ethical traditions engender a situational awareness that tends to the particulars of 
each ethical problem. While each paradigm offers perspicuous insights into our case, the 
process of examination also highlights alleged tensions that we believe merit attention.  
Because care ethics require a two-way relationship between the one-caring and the cared-
for, student indifference leaves the teacher working without any affirmatory response, 
thus suspending the caring relationship.  From an Aristotelian perspective, the lack of 
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response from student does not diminish the moral value of a teacher’s efforts  because  
steady attention and diligent effort are all intrinsically meritorious.  A teacher who strives 
to exemplify this ideal does not require external affirmation to validate her work, nor 
should she consider her efforts wasted when students do not respond in kind.  However, a 
focus on self-cultivation risks the absence of responsiveness and sensitivity inherent in 
the relational ethic that we believe essential to teaching.  Thus, both care and virtue ethics 
have their respective strengths and limitations.  Our paper attempts to combine these 
strengths while ameliorating their limitations with  a contemplative perspective based on 
Mahayana Buddhism, which has the potential to fill the gap between care and virtue 
ethics by altering our conception of self.  
 
The Case 
 Like many in her cohort, Sara entered the teacher education program with alacrity, 
led by a bright vision of making a difference in the lives of students.  She took to her 
duties with steady diligence, researching instructional strategies and planning lessons 
with meticulous attention.  Under the mentorship of an experienced school supervisor, 
Sara created many learning opportunities in which students explored and discussed 
salient themes from a variety of literary texts.  She applied imaginative lesson ideas to 
great effect, drawing from pop-culture, anime and graphic novels.  Both faculty and 
school supervisors were impressed by Sara’s inventiveness and the engaging learning 
experiences she designed for students.  Indeed, her performance exceeded what is 
expected of teacher candidates.  Furthermore, Sara implemented principles of formative 
assessment and provided timely qualitative feedback to her students’ work.  When 
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assignments did not meet expectations, Sara gave students opportunities to re-submit 
without penalty.  However, the ongoing support she provided to students meant countless 
hours of marking – a thankless labour that took a toll on her mental and emotional well-
being.  The relentless effort culminated in an emotional moment at a mid-term meeting 
with her supervisors. 
“I don’t know if I can keep doing this,” Sara confessed through teary eyes.   
 “Last weekend, I spent all of Saturday marking their responses to the novel.  I didn’t 
go to sleep until 2am on Saturday night.  Then, I got up early on Sunday morning 
and marked another six hours before spending the rest of the day preparing lessons 
for the week.  When I got back on Monday, I handed back the assignments and gave 
them an opportunity to redo the assignment at lunch.  Nobody came.  For the entire 
week, nobody came!  It’s like they didn’t even look at my comments.  I really want 
them to do well, and I’ve put my heart and soul into teaching them, but they don’t 
appreciate it.  They don’t know how much work I’ve put into this.”1.  
 Although both supervisors can relate to her frustrations, they find themselves 
searching for words.  Through their own experience, they have learned to moderate their 
expectations of students; however, protective of Sara’s outlook as a nascent educator, 
                                                        
1 Some educational theorists may want to examine the pedagogical merits of Sara’s work, including 
the design of her curriculum and her assessment practices.  Indeed, the absence of student 
engagement can often be explained in part by teaching practices that do not sufficiently appeal to the 
students’ imaginations, life experiences, and existing frames of reference.  However, in order to 
highlight the ethical issues that emerge from the life of the TC, we have decided to put aside 
pedagogical considerations, focusing instead on the ethical dilemmas in the teacher-student 
relationship.  The case assumes that Sara’s teaching and assessment practices are sound, and her 
assignments relevant and interesting.  While some may argue that innovative and engaging teaching 
designs eliminate the possibility of apathy, we have gathered through experience, both as teachers 
and teacher educators, that a host of factors affect levels of engagement, many of which lie outside 
the teacher’s sphere of control.  Even the most compelling educators can be met with indifference.  
Our case study, therefore, examines what happens when a teacher’s good efforts do not produce 
satisfying results. 
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they are reluctant to assuage Sara’s frustrations by lowering her expectations.  What 
substantive guidance could they offer beyond platitudinous comforts (It’s okay, you’ll get 
there . . .give yourself more time)?   
 
The Ethics of Care 
 Since its publication in 1984, Nel Noddings’ Care: a Feminine Approach to 
Ethics and Moral Education has garnered widespread attention and exerted considerable 
influence on the education community.  Noddings’ enduring contribution lies in her 
advancement of caring relations as a laudable ethical paradigm worthy of its place 
alongside vaunted moral traditions within western philosophy.  In so far as western 
philosophical traditions have privileged the discernment of action based on the exercise 
of reason by a moral agent, the emphasis on a relational conception of ethicality, and the 
elevation in moral status of one who receives an ethical act, remains Nodding’s salient 
contribution to moral philosophy.    
 Starting from the connection between mother and child, Noddings begins with 
relationship as the founding premise of her moral schema: 
Taking relation as ontologically basic simply means that we recognize human 
 encounter and affective response as a basic fact of human existence.  As we 
 examine what it means to care and be cared for, we shall see that both 
 parties contribute to the relation; my caring must be somehow completed in 
 the other if the relation is to be described as caring. (1984, p.4) 
This characterization of relational constituency defines Noddings’ theory; there can be no 
ethic of care without the acknowledgement of interpersonal connection as an immanent 
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feature of ethical theory and practice.  Upon analysis, however, we see that Noddings’ 
characterization of relation within the ethic of care entwines two propositions:  first, she 
posits the nature of human interaction, stating the fact of relatedness.   At the same time, 
she sets up a requirement for caring relations – in order for care to stand, there must be a 
relationship of reciprocity that completes the caring dynamic.  Thus, Noddings’ 
affirmation of the moral status of the caring relationship serves both as a description and 
an injunction:  care both is and must be relational.  While the descriptive aspect of her 
characterization has provoked less dispute, injunctive side of Noddings’ position has 
incited a wider debate, to which Noddings’ has devoted much of her exegesis in the 
ensuing years.  
 By requiring relational reciprocity in a caring relationship, Noddings in effect sets 
up a criterion for assessing  an interaction as  genuinely caring or not.  The one-caring 
and the one-cared-for designate  two sides of a transaction that cannot be completed 
without requisite action from both.  Reciprocity, in this context, does not denote a 
conventional quid-pro-quo, as if the cared-for requites the one-caring with a response 
commensurate with the initial caring act.  Rather, the cared-for responds to the one-caring 
in ways that acknowledge the care-giver, thus securing the caring relationship – a toddler 
is pacified and lulled to sleep in her mother’s soothing caress; an ailing patient smiles at 
his nurse when she massages his aching joints.  These responses, though perhaps 
considered trivial compared to the caring act, satisfy the motivations of the one-caring 
and completes the bidirectional transaction of reciprocity in caring relationships.  
 However, the requirement of reciprocity sets up the possibility of breach, when 
the lack of an appropriate or expected response from the cared-for poses a challenge to 
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the caring relation.  Noddings believes that a disruption in the relation renders the care 
ethic incomplete, wherein the one-caring is left to labour without satisfactory response 
from the cared-for:  
But if the cared-for does not complete my caring by receiving and acknowledging 
it, I may examine myself and ask, “Do I really care?”  In some cases, an 
affirmative answer comes through clearly and honestly.  I do care.  I shall always 
care.  The situation may be such that I just have to wait for my caring to be 
completed in the other and, if it never is, I see clearly that the attempt to care will 
nonetheless go on. (p. 37) 
Clearly, the one-caring may continue to care, but her efforts do not satisfy Nodding’s 
ideal of care practice; her labour, one sided as it is, likely deteriorates into an “attempt to 
care” rather than “care” proper.  This rupture in reciprocity constitutes what Noddings 
deems a “diminution of ethical ideals” (1984, p. 113), relegating the one-caring to the 
more daunting task of working in the absence or paucity of response that sustains her 
caring motivation. 
 By advancing reciprocity as a way to elevate the moral status of a care ethic, 
Noddings inadvertently implies the degradation of moral ideals when reciprocity is 
absent.  Caring, according to Noddings, is stalled and the one-caring is left laboring in 
futility or scrambling to restore the conditions in which reciprocity is possible.  This 
unfortunate consequence of Noddings’ otherwise profound theory has troubling 
implications for our beleaguered TC: as we saw in the case presented, the lack of 
response from her students leaves her discouraged and uncertain how to proceed ].  Her 
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own efforts do not affect a sufficient response to meet the requirements of an ethic of 
care; rather than a caring teacher, she becomes a teacher trying to care.  
 What would Noddings say to our emotionally depleted TC?  Faced with the 
question of apathetic students who inadvertently stall the caring relationship, Noddings 
steers clear of any response that deals specifically with a break-down of reciprocity and 
instead points to the institutional conditions that are inhospitable to caring relations, 
enjoining us to a reconceptualization of the school as a social institution: 
What I am recommending is that schools and teaching be redesigned so that 
caring has a chance to be initiated in the one-caring and completed in the cared-
for.  Sacrifices in economies of scale and even in programs might be called for. . .  
A school cannot be engrossed in anyone or anything.  But a school can be 
deliberately designed to support caring and caring individuals, and this is what an 
ethic of caring suggests should be done. (p. 182) 
In essence, Nodding’s response to indifferent students is to find fault, not with the 
aspirations of care ethics, but with school and social conditions that place obstacles in the 
road of care.  Accordingly, she urges reforms lies not in the revision of her conception of 
care ethics, but in the critique of institutions that are hostile to care ethics and urges 
reforms that create structures in which care and nurture thrive in ways otherwise 
impossible within the current establishment.  We stand with Noddings in her critiques of 
institutional designs that make caring relations difficult.  Indeed, the TC should not blame 
herself for breakdowns in caring relations due to institutional and cultural limitations 
beyond her control.  Since comprehensive school reform lies outside the parameters of 
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possibility for our scenario, we remain in search of practical guidance that will help our 
TC to proceed. 
  The importance of institutional reform notwithstanding, our TC must deal with 
the immediate situation as it stands, and the lack of an incisive response from care ethics 
can be construed as a problematic equivocation.  While the ethics of care has done much 
to affirm the importance of responsiveness and reciprocity, it leaves us  uncertain how to 
proceed when reciprocity is disrupted.  The teacher must continue to teach; the show (and 
the caring) must go on.  How might we recommend that she proceed without diminishing 
the value of her  work while sustaining her own resources in her professional dedication?  
 
Ethics of Virtue 
 Aristotelian virtue ethics has long propounded moral action as a manifestation of 
a foundational moral disposition cultivated through virtuous activity (Aristotle, 1999).  
Happiness, according to Aristotle, is experienced through the practice of virtuous acts 
that are intrinsically “noble and fine” (Vokey, 2001), and ought to be valued regardless of 
ensuing consequences.  Aristotle’s use of the word kalon to denote that which is noble 
and fine evokes the related term kalos, that which is beautiful, something that needs no 
further justification of merit outside itself (Owen, as cited in Vokey 2001).  Virtue, like 
beauty, is inherently compelling and thus requires no external affirmation in the form of 
positive outcomes – we find fulfillment when we undertake virtuous action and the merit 
of our efforts remain independent of consequences. 
 One contemporary elaboration of Aristotelian virtue ethics can be found in the 
work of Michael Slote. After carefully considering Noddings’ work, Slote argues that : 
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“it makes more sense to base an ethic of caring on the intrinsic moral value or 
admirability of a caring attitude than on the desirability or value (for participants or in 
general) of caring relationships” (Slote, 1999, p. 33).  The devoted daughter who cares 
for an aging parent with Alzheimer’s and the tutor who works with a child with 
significant developmental challenges may never experience the reciprocity envisioned by 
Noddings, nor will they ever see their care “completed” in the reciprocity moral that 
defines caring relations.  The cared-fors in these cases may never enjoy the benefit of 
knowing they are cared for, nor would they respond in any way that counts as sufficient 
reciprocity.  This lamentable reality, however, does not reduce the moral value of the 
action undertaken by the one-caring.  Noddings’ estimation of care, according to Slote, 
depends too much on “the accidental or unpredictable consequences of such caring” 
(1999, p. 33).  Slote argues that the care-giver who persists in her devotion despite the 
lack of requisite response for the cared-for remains morally admirable by virtue of her 
devotion; the moral value of her labour is undiminished by the absence of positive 
outcomes.  The lack of caring reciprocity, in other words, does not constitute a 
diminution of ethical ideals, as Noddings would have it; rather, it underscores the 
importance of care as a virtue practiced by an individual.  To be rapt in the well-being of 
another and to muster the efforts to serve the good of another is itself morally worthy, 
even if the other cannot recognize the beneficence of such action.   
 In her later commentary on the ethics of care, Noddings acknowledged the 
critiques raised about her work, but refrained from endorsing the caring as a virtuous 
attitude that imparts moral merit on the one-caring (Noddings, 1999, 2003).  Her 
reticence is understandable, of course.  Having argued the moral contribution of the 
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cared-for and highlighted the relational ties that form the preconditions of ethical action, 
she should hardly concede ground once again to virtue ethics, which sees more merit on 
the side of the one-caring.  To admit the exception is to undermine the heart of her ethical 
vision.   
 Slote points out, however, that care differs from traditional conceptions of virtue – 
it is one “that reaches out toward the other and in a psychological sense . . . involves 
connection with other people” (Slote, 1999, p. 34).  Noddings does not seem entirely 
averse to the conception of care as a virtue, having already considered care as a virtue in 
the earliest iterations of her work:  
 When we discuss the ethical ideal, we shall be talking about “virtue,” but we 
 shall not let “virtue dissipate into “the virtues” described in abstract 
 categories. . . the virtue described by the ethical ideal of one-caring is built up 
 in relation.  It reaches out to the other and grows in response to the other. 
Because we detect in this passage a close affinity between care ethics and Aristotelian 
virtue ethics, perhaps a commitment to excellence in caring for its own sake can properly 
motivate caring activity when the completion of care relations is not possible.  In this 
sense, a caring virtue is not merely personal, but has everything to do with the other.  
Sensitivity and responsiveness to the other, Slote might say, inheres in care as a virtue 
and operates according to the other-directedness that Noddings so esteems in her 
conception of the caring relationship. 
 Although Slote’s theoretical argument for care as a virtue appears to resolve the 
tensions that unfurl from Nodding’s care ethics, the practical question of how such a 
virtue plays out in our case, or how such a virtue can best be cultivated in the first place, 
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remains unclear.   Might our exhausted TC find comfort in knowing her efforts are 
admirable even if no student acknowledges or responds to her efforts?  Would we enjoin 
her to continue in devoting endless hours of marking, knowing that students will not take 
heed of her comments? We find it hard to issue such an exhortation, consigning the TC to 
arduous labour at this tender stage of her career.  In practice, the inherent happiness of 
virtues does not play out easily in the classroom, where the teacher and the student are 
bound in an inextricable relationship.  There is no virtue solely one’s own, no moral 
action entirely independent of the other, despite the complications that can arise as a 
result of such involvement.  If we insist in the teeth of hard reality that virtuous conduct 
ought to persist despite the lack of appreciation, then virtue ethics is no more than a 
personal practice that serves private ends, entirely separate from the relational cords that 
thread the web of a classroom community.  A teacher who insists on carrying out a noble 
work even though she evokes no response from students is caught in a fragmented picture 
of education.  Slote’s characterization of a “virtue that reaches out in community” may 
very well be a theoretical gloss that leaves a thorny practical dilemma unresolved.  For, if 
a teacher is only a teacher in the presence of students, any virtue appropriate to the 
teaching professional must by definition include students; there is no teacherly virtue 
apart from the virtues that arise in the connection with pupils.  In light of this definition, 
Slote’s assertion becomes an unintended truism that amalgamates care and virtue in an 
act of theoretical conflation – the practical question of how to care in a virtuous way 
within the inextricable teacher-student relationship remains unclear. 
 
Contemplative Perspectives:  Learning from the Bodhisattva Ideal 
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 Both Noddings and Slote have pondered the possibility of care as a relational 
virtue, a responsive intention that reaches out and grows in the presence of the other.  
This relational virtue bears notable resemblance to the ideal of the Bodhisattva in 
Mahayana Buddhism – a tradition that we are familiar with and from which we have 
drawn inspiration, personal and professional.  Whereas the earliest forms of Buddhism 
emphasized individual liberation from the cycle of suffering and rebirth via ethical 
conduct and meditative practice, the Mahayana tradition expands the notion of “self” and 
revises the previous understanding of “personal liberation” to include the liberation of all 
beings.  In the foundational tenets of co-dependent origination (pratitya samutpada) and 
emptiness (sunyata), Mahayana teachings deconstruct conceptions of a fixed and 
independent self, thus eschewing the notion of individual liberation while other beings 
brew in suffering.  In its detailed and meticulous treatment of metaphysics and ontology, 
the Mahayana tradition explicates the fundamental unity that underlies all phenomena, 
beyond all apparent dualisms.  We turn now to two seminal texts, the 
Mulamadhyamakarika (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way) and the 
Bodhicaryavatara (Path of the Bodhisattva), for supplementary insights to help us 
address the limitations of care and Aristotelian virtue ethics. 
 Nagarjuna, prominent Buddhist philosopher and founder of the Madhyamaka 
school of Buddhism in the second century C.E., provided a systematic articulation of 
Buddhist metaphysics that has informed Mahayana thought throughout the ensuing 
centuries (Edelglass & Garfield, 2009).  He argued that although entities appears distinct 
and separate, they do not exist independently; reality is interdependent, woven from a 
complex web of mutual causation.  Most western discourse on ethics, however, proceed 
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from the premise of independence.  For example, the connection between the one-caring 
and the cared-for is made possible by the involvement between two distinct alterities.  As 
we have seen, this relational involvement can be disrupted – but what if the one-caring 
and the one cared-for are bound on an ontological level, where the ties between the two 
lie not in caring reciprocity as conceived by Noddings, but rather in their mutual ontic 
involvement, having arisen from a co-dependent set of conditions, as proposed in 
Buddhist thought? 
 In the Mulamadhymakaarika, Nagarjuna introduces the tenets of Buddhist 
metaphysics (Edelglass & Garfield, 2009).  Emptiness (sunyata) refers to the absence of a 
fundamental, fixed and irreducible essence that constitute rudimentary reality; every 
phenomenon arises and subsides according to myriads of causes and conditions.  If a 
fundamental, irreducible and fixed essence existed, logically such an essence would 
require no conditions and causes for its existence, since by definition that which is fixed 
is fully sufficient as its own condition and cause.  Because all phenomena course in the 
river of impermanence, there cannot be any final essence that underlies reality.  The 
causal forces that lead to the appearance and dissipation of a phenomenon preclude the 
possibility of any definite essence, since such an essence does not require preceding 
conditions for its existence.  The lack of a definite essence that undergirds reality is thus 
deemed emptiness.  
 Because phenomena do not possess a final essence that qualifies as a sufficient, 
fixed and self-sufficient ontology, they are dependent on causes and cannot exist apart 
from the conditions from which they arise (pratitya-samutpada).   For example, in order 
for a wooden pencil to exist, there must first be a tree, which requires soil, moisture, 
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carbon, and organic nutrients.  These in turn require hospitable conditions afforded by a 
flourishing biosphere, a suitable climate produced by a life-sustaining planet, itself a 
child of the cosmos and the stellar forces that churn the universe.  The more we trace the 
causal origins of a single phenomenon, the more we realize that we are embroiled in a 
cosmic web.  Everything is implicated.  Thomas Merton once remarked: “I love beer and 
by that very fact, the world” (Merton & Cunningham, 1992, p. 377). In this sense, beer is 
not merely beer – it manifests the immeasurable conditions that furnish its creation.  The 
beer cannot be adequately ascribed to handful of conditions – rather, the entire universe is 
actualized in the beer.  Reality resists attempts to pin its ontology to any definite, linear 
line of causation.  Attempts to identify cause and effect runs into insuperable problems.  
Ours is a world of mutual causality (Macy, 1991).  
 If all things are co-dependent and co-involved, there cannot be any personal 
liberation apart from the liberation of all beings.  According to Buddhist teachings, a 
Bodhisattva is one who works unceasingly to alleviate the suffering of others.  One 
salient passage for the Bodhicaryavitara poignantly illustrates the Bodhisattva aspiration: 
 For all those ailing in the world, 
 Until their every sickness has been healed, 
 May I myself become for them 
 The doctor, nurse, the medicine itself. 
 Raining down a flood of food and drink, 
 May I dispel the ills of thirst and famine. 
 And in the ages marked by scarcity and want, 
 May I myself appear as drink and sustenance 
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 For sentient beings, poor and destitute, 
 May I become a treasure ever plentiful, 
 And lie before them closely in their reach, 
 A varied source of all they might need 
 (Shantideva, 1997, p. 50) 
The commitment of the Bodhisattva shares much affinity with care and virtue ethics; her 
concern for others should appeal to adherents of care ethics, and her dedication to a noble 
cause exemplifies the core of Aristotelian virtue ethics.  However, the Bodhisattva 
contributes to our discussion by qualifying the levels of involvement and soothing the 
frictions that can arise when theoretical delineations run against each other.  Buddhist 
metaphysics affirms co-dependence at an ontological level, such that a Bodhisattva 
recognizes her co-involvement with the students on an ontic basis.  A Bodhisattva, then, 
recognizes that we are bound to others in a way that is not contingent upon the responses 
of the cared-for to the one-caring.  Accordingly, the Buddhist teaching on threefold purity 
asserts that the generosity of the Bodhisattva  recognizes the inseparability of  the giver, 
the receiver and the act (Chökyi, 1994).  Applied to care ethics, we might say that the 
one-caring is inseparable from the cared-for; to work for the benefit of oneself is to work 
for the benefit of all beings.  A Bodhisattva is therefore less prone to frustration when the 
cared-for does not  reciprocate in ways that affirm the caring relationship.  Conversely, 
the aspirational nature of a Bodhisattva’s vow, recalls Aristotelian virtue ethics, enjoining 
the pursuit of noble ideals; for the Bodhisattva, however, the virtue in question is 
inherently relational and, given the realization of dependent-origination, must by 
definition be responsive to the other in continuous mutuality. 
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The Case Revisited and Implications for Teacher Education 
 How might ideals associated with the Mahayana Buddhism help our beleaguered 
TC?  We can begin by admitting that our conception of caring relation is precarious and 
vulnerable to disappointment if the one-caring and the cared-for are only understood as 
distinct monads.  A more stable foundation of ethical action is found when caring 
proceeds from the understanding of “self-and-other” as a continuity, which informs a 
“eudaimonic view of morality that aims at mutual harmony and flourishing amongst all 
beings whose existence is perceived to be interdependent and co-emergent” (Bai, 1999, 
p.7).  This ethical orientation, acknowledging the onotological co-involvement of all 
beings, operates from the realization of “ontonomy” as a hallmark of moral development 
(Bai, 1999).  Ontonomy, coined by Raimon Panikkar (1991), denotes a moral orientation 
informed by the realization of interconnectedness, wherein the self and the other become 
one ontological unit (Bai, 1999).   The realization of interconnectedness disposes us 
toward ethical action that is responsive and spontaneous; we are not ruled by ethical 
injunctions, nor are the merits of our actions contingent upon reciprocity or the 
completion of the caring relationship.  In this sense, caring no longer requires 
consequential objectives, such as happiness, peace or the recognition of benevolent 
intentions (Bai, 1999).  Just as we instinctively and reflexively reaches out to catch a 
falling teacup, without conscious adherence to abstract injunctions, a Bodhisattva, 
awakened to the reality of interdependence, naturally and instinctively reaches out in 
embrace of all beings in love and compassion.  Given inter-dependence, a Bodhisattva 
will likely see care as an immanent feature of one’s involvement with the world.  While 
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the lack of response from the cared-for may pose practical challenges for the Bodhisattva 
at the level of conventional reality, the quality of care at the deeper level of ontology 
remains unscathed. 
 For our TC, her efforts can be understood as a patient labour that actualizes her 
co-involvement with the students; the fruits of her toil are already ripe.  The students’ 
indifference does not suspend or frustrate her care; rather, it is merely part of the ebb and 
flow of her relational immersion.  No ethical ideal is diminished.  The ongoing effort of 
promoting the students’ well-being through education inevitably meets formidable 
challenges, but the teacher is able to face them as a form of self-cultivation, except in this 
case the “self” includes the other.  Learning becomes a collaborative project of collective 
well-being rather than a dialectic between two distinct monads encased in a circle of 
reciprocity.  The fact of a teacher’s caring involvement and engagement in the lives of 
students is itself a rudiment of ethical relations; this basic ethicality remains intact 
regardless of whether the classroom experience is brimming with joy or rife with 
heartbreak.  The moral act of teaching is bigger and more resolute than the varied 
attitudes and tendencies that students may bring to the classroom. 
 We are not recommending an overt treatment of obscure Buddhist metaphysics 
within a larger program of ethics education for teacher education. In this paper, we 
travelled through Buddhist metaphysics and ontology as a way to point out an aspect of 
relationality that is often left out in Western discourse: that the self is continually formed 
and reformed in the cauldron of mutual causality.  Prevailing modes of discourse within 
teacher education tend to see ethics as the interaction between teacher and students, each 
affecting the other in a linear or reciprocal line of exchange; recommendations for ethical 
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action often proceed from these premises.  A contemplative perspective via Buddhist 
metaphysics suggests a co-emergent and co-incidental view of ethical relations.  The 
teacher and the students are creating together, moment to moment, a host of ethical 
possibilities.   Each classroom situation, due to the co-involvement of teacher and student, 
is a manifestation of new challenges that shape the collective humanity emanating from 
the classroom.  For the teacher’s part, this co-emergent view of ethics requires a view of 
teaching as a form of self-cultivation wherein ‘self’ implies ‘self-with-other,’ a way of 
expanding the capacities of patience, attention, discernment, and responsiveness.  In this 
way, teaching becomes a form of contemplative practice (Falkenberg, 2012) that hones a 
teacher’s humanity by challenging and shaping her inner life.  Again, this is not to say 
that the teacher’s growth is entirely personal – there is no teacher without the student, no 
teacher development without student involvement.   
 With this co-emergent and co-incidental view of ethics, we can see ethics as a 
practice of “readiness-for-action” (Varela, 1999, p. 9), something formed in the 
immediacy of a given situation. While we infuse our relationships with caring intentions, 
we are not bound by expectations of reciprocity.  Aspiring to work for the well-being of 
students, we devote ourselves to their flourishing, but we do not strive for any sense of a 
pure, austere ideal, or a even sense of “mastery” as implied in Aristotelian virtue ethics.  
Our ethical efforts are always in keeping with where the students are and what they strive 
for as a part of their own ontogeny.   
 So where does this leave us with Sara, our weary TC?  We might suggest that she 
review and revise what it means to commit to students. We might emphasize that care 
does not demand toilsome labour from the teacher, neither do non-responsive students 
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disrupt the caring ethic.  Instead, she is forging an ethical collaboration in this shared 
space of mutual human development, the process of which sees her own development 
along side the changes in her students.  Seen in this light, ethics is less about doing what 
is right and more about than being responsive in the moment, and finding encouragement 
in mutuality rather than getting the efficacious results that follow deliberate effort. When 
she realizes this, she may not feel so daunted by the students’ current disengagement and 
may be able to refresh her attention to the students’ present state and return with new 
approaches.  Such an effort would constitute a vibrant ethical framework that we believe 
is more sustainable and humane, both to the teacher and the student. 
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